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Abstract 
 
As it is shown in the [1], the interaction between the natural 
monopoly (next NM) and the region is expedient to be carried out on the basis of a 
joint development railway transport program in this region. In fact, a decision to 
launch a project in a certain cooperation program configuration adds up to 
comparison of components efficiencies, included into the project, and proposed 
projects influence to the transport constituent of the region [1—3]. At the same time, 
the project configuration is an investment structure into ongoing project by 
stakeholders and, hence, this is a structure of incomes as consequences of project 
implementation.  
It should to be noted that there are some projects with low efficiency for one 
of the involved into the project parties. Despite this, these projects are implemented 
successfully in the case of all involved parties cooperation. This phenomenon 
cannot be explained within the frameworks of obviously unfavorable project to one 
of the parties.  Such projects can be both the preparatory project for 
implementation the bigger one with further expenses compensation and the element 
of compromise in agreeing the whole complex of projects that are balanced, 
mutually beneficial and effective for all the participants. 
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1 Formalization of the appropriate configuration program choice 
 
 
Developing a cooperation program or even a certain project, the responsible 
department NM is guided by corresponding ideas about current and strategic 
Company’s interests in the region, regional economic situation, regional interests in 
the railway transportation and etc.  Possible revenues from each certain project are 
calculated. The more exact the initial and forecast data are the more balanced, 
thoughtful and effective decision will be made.    
During the research of quality complex characteristics and interaction 
structure of the NM and regions, the effectiveness ratio was developed. This ratio 
allows evaluating effectiveness of both the implemented projects and the projects 
that require making a decision concerning implementation. 
The baseline data taken into account to solve a task of appropriate 
configuration program choice are the following:  - the number of projects implementing the interests of a NM and a region 
within the current period; - the total amount of funds required for the i-project implementation, where   1,2, … , ; 
 - the minimum amount that must be sent to the i-project of a NM to 
confirm a fact of participation in cooperation for this project,   1,2, … , . Let’s 
note that there are some items of cooperation program that fail to make a profit for 
NM themselves, however they have significant influence to the implementation of 
the whole cooperation program.    
 - the maximum amount that can be invested in the i-project by a NM,   1,2, … , ;  - the maximum amount that can be invested in all project of a concur 
program by a NM;  - the minimum amount that can be invested in the i-project by the regional 
administration,   1,2, … ,   - the maximum amount that can be invested in the i-project by the regional 
administration,   1,2, … , ;  - the maximum amount that can be invested in all projects by the regional 
administration  - rating of the i-project for a NM where  can vary from 1 to n, and the 
highest rating corresponds the meaning    1;  - rating of the i-project for the regional administration.  
The i-project internal parameters are allotted in a separate group. The nodes 
that take part in the cooperation of developing program are designated through the , . . . ,  ,, . . . ,  ,!"#  , . . . , $%&'( . The figure 2 shows the nodes split along 
sandwich-model planes according to their activity fields. 
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The internal i-project parameters can be divided into two blocks. The first one 
is data collected and calculated against a NM, i.e. the node ), the second one is 
data related to the regional administration, i.e. the node $. 
 
 
2 Effectiveness ratio calculation methodology of the regional 
authorities and the NM 
 
The internal i-project parameters that influence to decision-making about 
launching the cooperation program with the node )  ()  is a NM) are the 
following: *+",-  - the time of landing a node - ∈ /, 0, . . . ,  ,  , . . . , $12 by the 
node 3; 4+,-  - the lending volume of a node - ∈ /, 0, . . . ,  ,  , . . . , $12 
in $, implemented by a NM company’s own funds; 4(5-6 - the immediate income of the node 3 from the node -; 7+&-  - the actual losses of the node 3 from the interaction with the node - 
(according to prices level to date); 
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Fig.2. The nodes split along sandwich-model planes according to their 
activity fields 
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 8-  - the stability factor of a partner node -invested by both the own funds of 
node 3 and the debt funds; Δ:5-6 - the overall growth of the considered outputs on the invested node - , 
planned as the result of appropriate project implementation on the node - ∈/, 0, . . . ,  ,  , . . . , $12  (implementation the appropriate regional or 
territorial program); ;!"#-  - the potential guaranteed income from the alternative putting own 
funds of node 3 into a bank account that were allocated to the - enterprise 
project implementation; 0 = λ- = 1 - the extent of linkage of the node -implementing project with 
other projects and regional programs; 
Among the internal i-project parameters that have to be considered first and 
foremost during the regional interests’ assessment, one has to have data about the 
predicted parameters value change in the case of program implementation, defining 
its solvency:  Δ?@AB  - the change in export from the region, $/year; ΔC@AB  - the change in import in the region, $/year; Δ@AB  - the change of regional budget volume, $/year; ΔD@AB  - the population change in the region, people; Δ4@AB  - the change in the workplaces number, sq.km.; ΔE@AB  - the change of population loyalty, km; ΔΦ@AB  - the Federal impact factor (subsidies) for the region ($/year).  
Obtainment all mentioned above data should not pose a problem because in 
practice, the NM is aware of importance and impact of each certain project to the 
regional economy when cooperation programs are being agreed. 
In fact, participatory share of the parties in each project and efficiency and 
solvency depending on it, have to be reconciled by high-performance cooperation 
program configuration of a NM and certain subject of the RF. This is defined by the 
following parameters: G - the amount of funds allocated to the i-project NM, where   1,2, … , ; H  - the amount of funds allocated to the i-project be the regional 
administration, where   1,2, … , ; 
To calculate the efficiency of the program, the program should be presented 
as a one “large” project, where for its implementation all tasks that are necessary 
for each separate project implementation have to be completed.  
In this case, one can consider both the effectiveness ratio and the rate of 
program solvency change depending on the considered situation (x,y) and they can 
be expressed respectively as I5G, H6 and ΔJ5G, H6. Hence, the projected income 
for the NM can be expressed by the formula:  
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;5G, H6  1KLMLNO54(5-66 P α- ⋅ 5Δ:5-66S ⋅ 8- ⋅ 1 P λ-2 T
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-V P
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Then the overall effectiveness ratio of the NM program in the case (x,y) is:  
I5G, H6  ;5G, H6;5G, H6 P 1K ∑ X∑ 5;!"#- 6U-V YWV P 1K∑ X∑ \57+&- 6\$1 -VU YWV  
In the same way the ratios for the second party of interaction in the case (x,y) – 
regional administration - are:  
ΔJ5G, H6 L5α?@AB P α0C@AB P α]@AB P α^D@AB P α_4@AB P α`E@AB P αaΦ@AB 6$V  
  
 
3 Math model of development and reconciling cooperation 
programs 
 
Now there is a problem to find a situation (x,y), where the efficiency I5G, H6 
satisfies the NM, and the solvency change ΔJ5G, H6 meets the regional 
administration’s requirements, i.e. the common cooperation program in the 
configuration (x,y) can be accepted by both sides. 
To solve the problem of searching the suitable situation (x,y)  the best 
variant is game theory. Its mathematical apparatus allows choosing according to 
some criteria variants from all possible number of variants that satisfy both parties 
according to formulated interests of parties-players.  
The function named as the Rating of the situation (x,y) for the regional 
administration 7$5G, H6 is defined analogically.  
Among all the situations bc  5G5c6, H5c66 , where I  1, … ,d , obtained 
during solving the linear programming problem, let’s choose the situations that are 
optimal according to  Pareto criterion [4—8], i.e. the situations b∗  5G∗, H∗6 
where there are no more preferred for both players situations b  5G, H6, i.e. such 
that: I5G∗, H∗6 f I5G, H6, ΔJ5G∗, H∗6 f ΔJ5G, H6, 7)5G∗, H∗6 g 7)5G, H6, 7$5G∗, H∗6 g 7$5G, H6. 
Here 7)5G, H6 is the rating of situation (x,y) for the NM,  7$5G, H6 is the rating of situation (x,y) for the regional administration.  
According to the results of problem solving there is a set of Pareto efficiency 
situations b∗  5G∗, H∗6 
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By means of negotiations and discussion on the basis of calculations made 
above, from the limited set one can choose such situation, i.e. the configuration of 
the common program, that satisfies both parties by the effectiveness ratio and 
solvency, and, hence, by the income level, expenditure level and  its influence for 
the socio-economic performance of the region. 
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